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Re-entrant feedback, either within sensory cortex or arising from prefrontal areas, has been
strongly linked to the emergence of consciousness, both in theoretical and experimental
work. This idea, together with evidence for local micro-consciousness, suggests the gen-
eration of qualia could in some way result from local network activity under re-entrant
activation. This paper explores the possibility by examining the processing of information
by local cortical networks. It highlights the difference between the information structure
(how the information is physically embodied), and the information message (what the infor-
mation is about). It focuses on the network’s ability to recognize information structures
amongst its inputs under conditions of extensive local feedback, and to then assign infor-
mation messages to those structures. It is shown that if the re-entrant feedback enables
the network to achieve an attractor state, then the message assigned in any given pass
of information through the network is a representation of the message assigned in the
previous pass-through of information. Based on this ability the paper argues that as infor-
mation is repeatedly cycled through the network, the information message that is assigned
evolves from a recognition of what the input structure is, to what it is like, to how it appears,
to how it seems. It could enable individual networks to be the site of qualia generation.
The paper goes on to show networks in cortical layers 2/3 and 5a have the connectivity
required for the behavior proposed, and reviews some evidence for a link between such
local cortical cyclic activity and conscious percepts. It concludes with some predictions
based on the theory discussed.
Keywords: re-entrant feedback, qualia, information processing, local cortical network, network feedback, oscillatory
activity
INTRODUCTION
An important development in work exploring mechanisms under-
lying consciousness has been a move from the important search for
Neural Correlates of Consciousness (Rees et al., 2002; Koch, 2004)
to a deeper look at mechanisms involved, a search for Explana-
tory Correlates of Consciousness (Seth, 2009), the neural processes
that can actually account for fundamental properties of conscious
experience. A key element in this work is the search for mecha-
nisms that can account for the phenomenal aspects of the contents
of consciousness, such as perceptual experiences.
An important set of ideas about the locus of conscious percepts
revolves around the concept of re-entrant feedback. Originally
proposed by Edelman (1992, 2003) it has been explored by a num-
ber of others (e.g., Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Bullier, 2001;
Pascual-Leone and Walsh, 2001). The basic idea is that information
entering the cortex is initially fed-forward through the hierarchy
of areas in the sensory cortex, onto motor cortex, and prefrontal
areas, but that concluding network states in higher regions would
be fedback to modulate and integrate the incoming sensory stream.
It has been seen to provide the basis for perceptual organiza-
tion (Lamme and Spekreijse, 2000) where higher level conclusions
about the meaning of sensory information are used to fine-tune
the lower level building blocks until an agreement is achieved,
and has parallels with modeling approaches such as Grossberg’s
Adaptive Resonance Theory (Grossberg, 1976) and his ideas about
the fine tuning of sensory inputs via top-down feedback (Raizada
and Grossberg, 2003). There is growing experimental evidence that
this re-entrant feedback is crucial to the development of conscious
percepts (e.g., Haynes et al., 2005; Silvanto et al., 2005; Boehler
et al., 2008).
The feedback can be at different levels. For full-blown conscious
visual perception Lamme has argued that the re-entrant activity
arises from the prefrontal cortex as part of attentional activation
following an initial feed-forward stream from the visual cortex
(Lamme, 2010). Rees has also argued for the need for this higher
level re-entrant activity to be a key feature of conscious vision (Rees
et al., 2002; Rees, 2007). It would seem to be an essential compo-
nent of access consciousness, that is the phenomenon whereby
information in our minds is accessible for verbal report, reason-
ing, and the control of behavior. Block (1998) distinguished access
consciousness from the phenomenal experiences of qualia. Lamme
(2010) has gone on to argue that re-entrant activity within the
visual cortex itself could lead to conscious percepts during iconic
memory. Boehler et al. (2008) showed that such local re-entrant
feedback can lead to early awareness of sensory information which
was far too rapid to involve prefrontal attentional feedback.
In a completely different approach Zeki and colleagues showed
that conscious perception of color is perceived before motion
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(Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997; Zeki and Bartels, 1998), and there-
fore argued for the existence of micro-consciousness within
given areas of the cerebral cortex (Zeki, 2001). Taken together
the ideas of re-entrant feedback and micro-consciousness seem
to be arguing that re-entrant feedback activation is neces-
sary for conscious percepts, but that the site of the neural
activity from which they emerge could be quite a local one
(Figure 1).
This line of argument seems to be moving toward a conclu-
sion about a set of neural activities that lead to the generation
of consciousness. The unanswered question still of course is that,
even if these mechanisms can be shown to lead to conscious per-
cepts, what is it about the local activity that generates experience?
How can this defined neural activity lead to phenomenology?
What is the process whereby qualia are formed? It is the essen-
tial question behind the hard problem of Chalmers (1995) or
the explanatory gap of Levine (1983). The thinking around re-
entrant feedback appears to suggest that there is something about
the activity of localized areas of cortical tissue that under top-down
feedback activation transforms their activity in some way that leads
to an experiential outcome. This paper explores the behavior of
local cortical networks under the activation of top-down feed-
back from an information processing perspective, to see if there
is anything in that behavior that could lead to the emergence of
qualia.
Tononi proposed that conscious states are characterized by
the fact that they involve information that is highly integrated
and highly differentiated, and went on to propose measures to
quantify the informational relationships generated by networks
(Tononi, 2004; Balduzzi and Tononi, 2009). This paper also takes
an information-based perspective to explore the pattern recog-
nition capabilities of networks of pyramidal cells. It analyses the
behavior of networks encouraged by top-down feedback to engage
in extensive local feedback to themselves and to establish attractor
states, and to examine how they process the fedback represen-
tations they generate as outputs. It is argued that the ability to
repeatedly recognize their own representations in cycles of local
feedback could lead to the generation of qualia. It develops further
previous studies on self-reflective neural circuits (Orpwood, 2007,
2010).
FIGURE 1 | Diagram showing the feed-forward sweep and re-entrant
feedback of information felt to be necessary for conscious percepts.
The conscious percept itself could arise in some way from local activity in
the sensory cortex stimulated by the re-entrant feedback, as indicated by
the star.
INFORMATION PROCESSING IN LOCAL NETWORKS
SPATIAL PATTERN RECOGNITION
The paper focuses on the behavior of networks of pyramidal neu-
rons exposed to spatial patterns of information. For individual
pyramidal cells these spatial patterns would consist of the distrib-
ution of inputs over the surface of the cell during any given epoch
of time in the order of a few milliseconds. For networks spatial
patterns would again be the distribution of inputs to the various
cells within the network (see Figure 2). Much of the discussion of
pattern recognition in neurons relates to temporal patterns, con-
stituting a form of neural “code” (Theunissen and Miller, 1995;
Rolls and Treves, 2011). This paper argues that although temporal
patterns clearly are processed, both individual pyramidal cells and
networks of those cells are also very able to recognize spatial pat-
terns, and that this process is particularly important to the process
of perception, and to the argument below for the emergence of
qualia. The paper therefore reflects the views of Harris that the
fundamental currency of information processing in the cortex is
the spatial pattern of firing activity of single assemblies of neurons
(Harris, 2005).
Modeling work has shown that individual pyramidal cells
should have the ability to recognize spatial patterns in the input
information that they receive (Mel, 1992; Orpwood, 1994). Recep-
tor sensitivities become adjusted as a result of training. Following
this learning the cumulative excitatory post-synaptic potential
(EPSP) generated in the soma reflects the degree to which the cur-
rent input pattern is similar to ones experienced during training.
If the depolarization reaches threshold then the cell essentially rec-
ognizes the input pattern, and can signal that recognition by firing.
Many different input patterns can be learned, but the only output
available to the cell is to signify that it has recognized the input. Of
course rates of firing may reflect depth of depolarization, and cells
can also demonstrate different types of firing response, such as
regular or burst firing, but they cannot provide information about
FIGURE 2 | Diagram illustrating the processing of spatial patterns of
information by a network of pyramidal cells.The darker components of
the input and output patterns, and the darker axonal connections, both
represent firing activity.
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the identity of their input patterns. So a cortical pyramidal cell can
recognize spatial patterns and can signal recognition but cannot
differentiate between the different input patterns that it has learnt.
This inability is overcome when cells are connected in networks,
and where the input pattern is fed to the cells within this network.
If the input pattern is sufficiently similar to those experienced dur-
ing training, then across the network a number of different cells
will fire in response to the input pattern. The firing indicates that
the input pattern has been recognized, and the distribution of this
activity is a unique response of that network to the input pattern.
It constitutes the network’s output, and it provides information
that reflects the nature of the recognition that has taken place, the
identity of the input pattern to that network (Figure 2).
ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION PROCESSING
This paper aims to examine the behavior of such networks from
an information processing point of view. The term “information”
can be used to mean quite different things. In terms of cortical
information processing it is important to distinguish between the
information message, and the information structure. The infor-
mation message is what the information is about, what it is
communicating. The information structure is the physical form
by which the information is carried, the way in which the infor-
mation message is embodied. For example, firing patterns being
communicated to the V4 area of the visual cortex may include
information structures that relate to the color blue in the visual
environment. The information message is the color blue, the infor-
mation structure is the firing activity that represents the blue color
(see Figure 3).
The information structure is a physical entity and can be ana-
lyzed using the mathematical tools of information science. The
information message is a more abstract concept and is at the core
of phenomenology. The content of consciousness comprises infor-
mation messages, not their structure. The whole mental world of
individuals is made up of information messages. On the other
hand the neurobiological mechanisms taking place in the brain
are engaged with processing information structures. The chal-
lenge to neurobiology is to explain how the brain is able to release
into awareness the information messages that are embodied in the
information structures of physical neural activity.
The relationship between the information structure and the
information message is a crucial one. Consider initially a basic
information sender. The sender is configured to initiate the gener-
ation of an information structure following some internal change
of state. For example, the sender might be a simple timer. The
timer has some form of internal clock, and it is configured to
send out a signal when the clock reaches a certain time. The sig-
nal is the sender’s output information structure. For that sender
it represents the event “time reached.” There is of course no phe-
nomenology involved. The sender does not experience the event.
It simply reacts to the event by generating an information struc-
ture. For that sender “time reached” is the information message.
The signal that it generates is the information structure. The infor-
mation structure represents the information message, but only for
that sender.
For a receiver of this information the information structure can
represent an infinite number of different messages. Consider an
information receiver that has the capability to recognize the infor-
mation it receives. If it is able to recognize an input structure then
there will be some reaction to the presence of the input informa-
tion it receives. It may just react by some activity that represents a
level of familiarity, like the level of depolarization of a pyramidal
cell. Or it may react by generating some specific activity which rep-
resents a recognition, like a pyramidal cell firing. Or it may react
with a more complex activity like a network firing pattern, gen-
erating an information structure in its own right. But whatever it
does in reaction to the input information it can only recognize the
information structure. It cannot recognize information messages.
But this doesn’t mean that the receiver cannot associate a mes-
sage with the input structure. Consider a receiver like a network
of pyramidal cells that will react to a recognition by generating
a repeatable pattern of firing. If the network responds by always
FIGURE 3 | Diagram illustrating the difference between information structures and information messages in cortical information processing.
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generating a particular information structure whenever it receives
a certain input, then it is not just recognizing the input structure,
it is identifying it. The firing response is its output information
structure, and it is that network’s representation of the identity of
the input structure. It does not of course know about the input, in
the sense expressed by Clark and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) of the
network’s knowledge being knowledge TO the network. It is not
identifying the input in any experiential sense, but it is undertak-
ing an identification. It is responding to an input by generating
a repeatable information structure, and that structure represents
the identity of the input to the network. If in this way the input
information has some identity to the receiver then this identity
constitutes an information message. The receiver has recognized
the input information structure and generated an output infor-
mation structure that represents the identity of the structure to
the network, and thereby associates an information message with
the input it has received.
So cortical networks are receivers of information, and can
recognize and identify incoming information structures. The net-
work’s cells cannot recognize a message in the incoming informa-
tion, only its structure. Cortical networks can also act as senders
of information. If an input information structure is identified,
the network will respond by generating its own output informa-
tion structure. The output structure represents the identity of
the input structure to the network, the message that is assigned
(Figure 4A).
IMPACT OF FED-FORWARD AND FED-BACK INFORMATION
The network output can be communicated to a new downstream
network. The new network can recognize the input structure it is
receiving but not its message. The new input is just an information
structure that the new network can recognize or not, depending
on its learning. Similarly the network can feed its output back to its
input again. This is local feedback, with the network’s cells feeding
back directly to the cells in the network. The output from the first
pass-through of information becomes the input for the next pass-
through. Again if the fedback information is recognized, it is just
the information structure that is recognized, not the information
message.
So the network is able to recognize its initial input structure,
identify a message, and generate an output that represents that
message. If that output structure is locally fedback and recognized
then the network is recognizing the representation it has just gen-
erated. But it cannot recognize messages. It cannot identify these
fedback structures as its own representations. As far as the net-
work’s cells are concerned they are just receiving input structures,
and can respond to those structures by indicating a recognition or
not.
The information processing becomes more interesting when
the feedback activity has enabled the network to settle into an
attractor state. Once an attractor has been established then the
network will generate an output structure that is the same as its
input structure (Amit, 1989). It is therefore self-recognizing. It is
recognizing its own output structure, and generating an output in
response that is the same. So what is the identity of the fedback
input to the network? The output is a structure that represents
the identity of the input to the network. But in an attractor state
FIGURE 4 | (A) Diagram illustrating the way a network can recognize
information structures, assign messages to them, and generate output
information structures that represent the message assigned. (B) Diagram
showing how in attractor behavior the network assigns a message of
“representation of previous message” to it’s feedback inputs.
the input is the same as the output. So in this state the output
is a representation of its own identity to the network. This is an
important property of how a network responds when it is in an
attractor state. Once an attractor state has been established, the
output is a representation of its own identity to the network. But
the cyclic feedback can continue, and if the attractor state is main-
tained for a few cycles then the identity will evolve. With each cycle
the output is still a representation of the identity of itself, but each
time this occurs the identity of itself is the identity of the previous
output. With each cycle the output becomes a representation of
the identity it had on the previous cycle.
As was argued above, the identification process assigns an infor-
mation message to the incoming information structure. So in an
attractor state the fedback information structure is identified as
the network’s own representation of the last message assigned.
This identity becomes the new assigned message. Each time an
information structure is cycled through the network in an attrac-
tor state the message assigned is “representation of the previous
message assigned.” As information is cycled through the network
the information structure stays the same, and the information
message also stays the same. The information message assigned
on each pass is “representation of the message assigned in the
previous pass” (Figure 4B).
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This behavior is a unique response of networks that can recog-
nize and identify information structures, and feed representations
of the identity back to themselves. If they can be encouraged
to develop attractor states, then the networks can demonstrate
a unique behavior. They can repeatedly identify their own repre-
sentations. This behavior, derived from a consideration of infor-
mation processing in cortical networks, can be argued to provide
those networks with experiential abilities.
IMPLICATIONS OF ANALYSIS FOR VISUAL CORTICAL PROCESSING
This section explores the implications of the previous analysis on
the capabilities of networks undergoing attractor behavior. Con-
sider a network in the V4 visual area that has undergone learning
during the early development of the brain. Assume that as a result
of this learning this particular network is now able to respond to
the color blue in its visual environment. If attention is focused on
the network then it will receive re-entrant feedback activation. This
activation could enable the network to develop attractor behavior,
as it repeatedly feeds back its own output back to itself. What is
the nature of this network’s response to the patterns of input it
receives? To the receiving network in V4 the sensory input pat-
tern from the environment is just information with a particular
information structure. The first time the network recognizes that
information structure then at the point of recognition it will assign
its own message to it, and generate an output with a structure that
represents that internal message.
The network is undergoing local cyclic feedback. It is also under
re-entrant activation, and this activation has enabled the network’s
local feedback activity to settle into an attractor state. In this state
the network recognizes its fedback information structures as rep-
resentations of the previous internal messages assigned. To the
network, each time its output is fedback it is identified in the
same way. It is identified as its own representation of the previous
message (Figure 4B).
So at the start of the cyclic activity, if the input information
structure can be labeled as “x,” then the network recognizes the
input structure and generates an output that represents the identity
of the input, the identity of “x.” The identity of the input is simply
what “x” is to the network. When this is fedback in an attractor
state the input is identified, as argued above, as its own representa-
tion of the previous identity. So it is identified as its representation
of the identity of “x.”The network is no longer just recognizing the
pattern “x” as it did in the first cycle, it is recognizing a pattern that
is this network’s representation of “x.” It is recognizing something
about the way that the network embodied the identity of “x,” the
way that it depicted it. There is a relationship between the iden-
tity and the representation of the identity. The identity is, in some
way, embodied in the representational structure that the network
generates. When it generates that representational structure the
network has to portray what the identity is like to it. If the net-
work then recognizes its own portrayal, it is recognizing what the
identity was like to the network when it generated the represen-
tation. So the fedback representation is recognized as being what
the identity is like to the network. Again there is no experiencing
of “what it is like.” It is simply the relationship between the infor-
mation and the network. Therefore, following the first feedback,
the network is not recognizing what “x” is, but what “x” is like.
The output pattern is again fedback to the network, and iden-
tified as a representation of its previous output. So the identity of
the feedback is “representation of what ‘x’ is like.” The network
recognizes the new fedback input as a representation of what “x” is
like to it. The representation that is recognized is again a depiction,
a non-verbal description, but this time it is a depiction of what “x”
is like to the network. It is not just recognizing the fact of what “x”
is like, but how the network has depicted that likeness to itself. It
recognizes it as a kind of abstract inner appearance, not just in a
visual sense, but an appearance involving all of its attributes. So
this time around the network is recognizing the input as how “x”
appears to the network.
The process continues and the feedback is then identified as
“representation of how ‘x’ appears.” The network recognizes the
input as a depiction of how “x” appears to it. It is a depiction of an
abstract inner appearance. It is recognizing how its own internal
appearance of “x” is depicted, its own inner abstract construct of
“x,” its own inner image of “x.”What is recognized is how“x”seems
to the network. Up to this point in the argument there has been no
assumption of any experiential outcomes from the information
processing taking place. However the conclusion after a few cycles
of feedback is that the network is recognizing its input structure
as how its original input “seems” to it. This outcome is identical to
the concept of qualia. It is how the network experiences its input.
To an observer monitoring the behavior of the network in V4 as
the blue information is received, the initial network response is
one of recognizing blue. With the cyclic feedback the response is
observed to evolve to recognizing what blue is like to the network,
to how it appears, to how it seems. To an observer the network is
experiencing the blueness of blue. The blueness label can only be
applied by the observer of course. To the network it has simply
recognized how its original input information structure seems to
it, how it experiences it (Figure 5).
Therefore the possible chain of events during sensory process-
ing could be as follows. Information is received into a cortical
sensory hierarchy and follows a fast feed-forward sweep through
to motor and prefrontal areas. Attentional re-entrant feedback
interacts with the sensory areas (equivalent to Lamme Stage 4
visual processing Lamme, 2010). The re-entrant feedback encour-
ages networks within the sensory hierarchy to engage in local cyclic
feedback and establish attractor states, depending on the focus of
attention. Information is now locally fedback through these net-
works in a cyclic manner. On each pass-through of information
the networks recognize their input information as a representa-
tion of the identity established in the previous pass. If the network
initially recognizes an input, it simply recognizes its identity, what
it is. If it recognizes a representation of its identity, it recognizes
what it is like. If it recognizes a representation of what it is like, it
recognizes how it appears. If it recognizes a representation of an
appearance, it recognizes how it seems. In this way the top-down
activation could enable the information received by local cortical
networks to be experienced.
RELATION TO OTHER HYPOTHESES
Most hypotheses concerning consciousness concern access to con-
sciousness rather than the cause of the generation of phenome-
nal experience. There are quite a number of process models of
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FIGURE 5 | Diagram illustrating the cycling of information
through the same network during attractor behavior, and how
the message assigned progressively changes.The inputs are
initially recognized as what the input is to the network, but the
recognition changes on each pass to become what it is like, to how it
appears, to how it seems.
consciousness that have been proposed, where there are execu-
tive processes going on whereby certain mental representations
dominate over others to enable consciousness to emerge. Baars’s
(1988) Global Workspace model is an important example of this
approach. Distributed unconscious processors compete for access
to a global workspace which controls and coordinates their activ-
ities. Those that are successful have their messages elevated to
consciousness and broadcast throughout the cortex. The nature
of the carriers of explicit representations is less important than
what the system does with them. Such theories have been very
successful in guiding thinking about the processes that are neces-
sary for consciousness to emerge. However they have nothing to
say about the mechanism of generation of phenomenal experience.
Others have focused more closely on relating phenomenal expe-
rience with the vehicles of explicit representation in the cortex.
For example O’Brien and Opie (1999) developed a theory which
linked connectionism with experience. They saw consciousness
as a myriad of individual phenomenal experiences, where each
experience correlated with a pattern of stable activity in a local-
ized region of a brain-wide connectionist network. However they
did not attempt to show a causal link between the pattern of stable
activity and the emergence of phenomenal experience. The current
paper takes a similar view that local settled activity correlates with
experience, but the stable activity is that of stable attractor states,
and the stability is required to enable information structures to be
cycled through the network to allow higher-order representations
to emerge. The key point of the paper is a detailed argument for
how the nature and operation of these states can lead to the emer-
gence of an experience. Others have also taken a non-specialized
vehicle-based approach (e.g., Mathis and Mozer, 1996; Zeki, 2001).
Mathis and Mozer proposed that the contents of consciousness
correspond to transiently stable states in an interconnected net-
work of computational modules. These authors developed a model
of a possible module that incorporated an attractor architecture,
and felt that the development of a stable attractor was necessary
for awareness. Again there was no attempt to explain how the
development of attractors leads to a phenomenal outcome.
An important insight into how higher representational states
could be generated came with the idea of representational re-
description, where a system is able to reflect on its own internal
states (Clark and Karmiloff-Smith, 1993). Theses ideas underpin
proposals such as the “radical plasticity thesis” (Cleeremans, 2008)
where a system is able to re-describe its own activities to itself.
They are also key to the idea of metacognition requiring higher-
order representations that emerge when the system observes its
own internal states through having access to relevant lower-order
knowledge (Pasquali et al., 2010). The focus of the current hypoth-
esis is more on how these higher representational states can be
generated within networks themselves.
The paper is highlighting the fact that at some point any
hypothesis has to address the question of where the phenome-
nal component of consciousness arises from. What is it that causes
an experience? The current work attempts to address this question
directly, by looking at the way the information messages assigned
by networks are changing during attractor behavior. It would argue
that lower-order networks should be able to generate qualia if they
are excited to attractor states, but so too could higher-order net-
works engaged in metacognitive activities. It is assumed that a large
number of coincident attractors would result from the general
brain-wide constraint satisfaction that many theories imply settles
down at the moment of a conscious perception. It is very likely
that the ability of any given specialized network to settle into an
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attractor state is going to be dependent on its interaction with other
networks. The top-down focusing provided by re-entrant feedback
is just one of these interactions. The interactions will inevitably
lead to various transient activations that don’t enable networks to
settle into attractors. The competition going on between networks
would ultimately lead to a point where there is a set of winners
that have activity sustained long enough for attractors to form
and continue for few cycles. Each of these stable attractor states
would provide qualia. The sum of all these qualia, as the global
constraint is satisfied, would form the subjective conscious expe-
rience at that moment. So the theory is perfectly compatible with
process theories of consciousness such as Global Workspace, and
its competition between unconscious processors leading to win-
ners accessing a global workspace. Therefore the proposed theory
is just saying that no-matter what process is involved in the orga-
nizing of consciousness there has to be at some point a mechanism
that causes the generation of phenomenal experience, and it is
suggesting a mechanism that could generate it.
EVIDENCE FOR THE BEHAVIOR DISCUSSED
CORTICAL NETWORK MICROANATOMY
How well does the theory outlined above map onto the known
microanatomy and dynamics of local networks in the cerebral
cortex? The theory revolves around the establishment of repeated
cycles of activity through cortical networks following local feed-
back, and for this activity to be under top-down re-entrant
facilitation. For this to occur there are two key requirements.
• There needs to be large amounts of local feedback from
pyramidal cells in the network back to the network again.
• There needs to be connections to layer 1 of the cortex to receive
top-down re-entrant inputs, either from other areas in the
cortical sensory hierarchy, or from the prefrontal cortex.
A number of local networks have substantial local feedback,
particularly those involving layer 2/3 pyramidal cells (Thomson
et al., 2002a). For direct access to the top-down inputs received
by layer 1, the cells require apical dendrites that extend into
this uppermost layer. Two networks stand out as satisfying these
anatomical requirements. First of all networks in layer 2/3, where
there are extensive local connections between layer 2/3 pyramids,
and where the pyramidal cells have apical dendrites that climb to
layer 1 (Thomson et al., 2002b). Secondly networks in layer 5, par-
ticularly those in the upper part of the layer with pyramidals in
layer 5a. When the large pyramidal cells are close to each other in
this layer they are particularly densely interconnected (Markram
et al., 1997). These cells have a very robust climbing apical den-
drite that forms a well-developed tuft in layer 1 (Thomson and
Lamy, 2007). Pyramidal cells in layer 4 can have apical dendrites
extending into layer 1 but the bulk of the cells in this layer are spiny
stellate cells that have just local inputs. The layer 4 stellate cells do
have high levels of local connectivity however (Lund, 1973). Layer
6 pyramidal cells have less extensive local feedback, and only the
sparse claustrum-projecting cells have apical dendrites that can
reach up to layer 1 (Katz, 1987). It is felt that the local connectivity
requirements demanded by the theory outlined are well met by
networks in layer 2/3 and layer 5a. For a comprehensive review of
local circuit connectivity in the neocortex, see Thomson and Lamy
(2007).
CORTICAL NETWORK DYNAMICS
It has been a key part of theoretical thinking since the 1980s that
attractor behavior in local cortical networks underpins the devel-
opment of concepts or percepts (Hopfield, 1982; Amit, 1989).
However reliable evidence that these states are achieved has been
hard to come by. This is partly because such states result from
the behavior of quite large populations of neurons, and it is
not straightforward analyzing the behavior of large numbers of
cells to explore their population dynamics. Direct observation of
population behavior has been made somewhat easier with the
development of optical imaging techniques, particularly 2-photon
calcium imaging (Wallace and Kerr, 2010). Although the indi-
cation of cell firing is indirect there is strong evidence that the
calcium transients that are imaged closely reflect cell firing (Kerr
et al., 2005). Using this technique Cossart et al. (2003) reported
activity that closely resembled attractor behavior, interestingly pri-
marily in layer 2/3 and layer 5 networks. Others have reported
similar behaviors (e.g., Ikegaya et al., 2004). On the other hand
Durstewitz and Deco (2008) have presented evidence that stable
attractor states are often not achieved. They showed that quasi-
stable states that are attractors in the making can contain useful
information (Mazor and Laurent, 2005) and have suggested may
be the primary manifestation of evolving percepts.
If information is being repeatedly cycled through local net-
works when activated by top-down feedback then you might
expect to detect some oscillations in the local field potentials
(LFPs) recorded in activated networks, and in scalp recordings
of electric or magnetic fields. Crick and Koch (1990) suggested
over 20 years ago that synchronous neural firing at the gamma fre-
quency might be a neural correlate of visual awareness. Episodes of
induced gamma activity that are not time-locked to the stimulus,
and can be generated by anticipation and imagination as well as
sensory input (Tallon-Baudry, 2003), are conjectured to be linked
to top-down feedback, as part of the perception process (Fisch
et al., 2009; Privman et al., 2010; Martinovic and Busch, 2011).
This stimulus-linked gamma activity could reflect the cyclic feed-
back activity under re-entrant feedback that this paper predicts. It
has long been reported that EEG gamma oscillations are associated
with networks that are under attentional focus (Fries et al., 2001;
Womelsdorf et al., 2006) with a marked increase in gamma power
with attention. In monkey visual cortex this increase has been
well documented in V4 (Taylor et al., 2005; Chalk et al., 2010).
Chalk and colleagues have shown differential responses, with an
enhancement in V4 and concomitant decrease in V1, as would
be expected depending on the focus of attention. Gaillard et al.
(2009) monitored intracranial potentials during conscious access
and showed a marked increase in high-gamma power when access
was achieved.
There is some evidence for a link between gamma frequency
EEG responses and the establishment of conscious pain percepts.
The typical short latency evoked slow EEG response has long been
thought to reflect pain perception (e.g., Tzabazis et al., 2011).
However with repetitive brief pain stimuli the amplitude of the
slow response decreases with each repeat, despite a report of the
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same pain level by the subject (Iannetti et al., 2008). Therefore
it is now concluded that the slow response is more likely reflect-
ing attentional processes (Legrain et al., 2011). Brief bursts of
gamma activity are also induced by brief pain stimuli, and corre-
late closely with the pain reported (Gross et al., 2007). The power
of the induced gamma responses does not decrease with stim-
ulus repetition, and these gamma responses are now concluded
to more accurately reflect processes underlying pain perception
(Zhang et al., 2012).
From modeling work, it would seem that oscillations in the
gamma band are primarily driven by fast spiking interneurons
(Wang and Buzsaki, 1996; Bartos et al., 2007). Clearly gamma
activity as detected in EEGs and LFPs is likely to primarily reflect
activity in pyramidal cells, because of their numerical predomi-
nance and microanatomy, but the dynamics of these local oscil-
lations are probably controlled by the interneuron activity. Their
activity could set the sampling rate for the network (Buzsaki and
Chrobak, 1995), providing the time window for spatial pattern
recognition.
PREDICTIONS
There are a number of predictions that result from the the-
ory outlined. Under conditions of top-down activation, such as
during attentional focus, firing patterns of pyramidal cells in
local networks should repeat over several cycles. This response
should be more likely in layer 2/3 or 5a networks. This activ-
ity should stop if the attentional focus shifted, such as follow-
ing presentation of a distractor. Such work could be done in
awake animals. It would be useful if such work could be used
to provide an EEG or MEG signature that could be explored
in awake humans. Such a signature could be a gamma fre-
quency response, perhaps with a particular time course and
power envelope, perhaps with a particular spread of frequen-
cies. To provide the link with qualia, subsequent work would
need to be done on human subjects. If it were possible of
course, the ideal signature would be obtained from humans,
in parallel with detection of attractor behavior during surgical
procedures.
If a signature of local attractor behavior could be obtained
then it would predicted that it should correlate with the conscious
report of the subject. For example if the subject were presented
with a blue light stimulus it would be expected that the signa-
ture would be detected and localized to the V4 area. Both the
amplitude or power of the response,and its duration, should reflect
the subjects report. If a pair of brief sensory inputs were presented
with reducing separation until the transient percepts merged, then
the signature would also start as separate waveforms that merged
at the same point as the percepts.
A number of experimental approaches have been used to
explore correlations between neural activity and subjective
responses (see Rees, 2007 for review). Activity relating to a stim-
ulus can be recorded in the visual cortex during unconscious
processing following techniques such as masking. It would be
expected that such activity would not lead to the attractor sig-
nature. The signature should be detected during activity relating
to illusory figures or during hallucinations. Activity relating to
binocular rivalry should also only reflect the signature during
the perceived part of the alternating cortical response. Detailed
examinations of cortical activity during binocular rivalry can
show responses in the suppressed area that are still sufficient
for the experimenter to identify the stimulus, but that neverthe-
less remains phenomenally invisible to the subject (Rees, 2007).
Such activity should still only generate the signature on the side
perceived by the subject. Phosphenes resulting from transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation should lead to the signature being
generated.
CONCLUSION
Both theoretical thinking and experimental work has shown the
importance of re-entrant feedback on the emergence of conscious
percepts in the sensory cortex. The paper has argued that one con-
clusion would be that conscious percepts result in some way from
the local activity of the cortical networks receiving the top-down
feedback. From an examination of the information processing
capabilities of local networks it has been shown that interest-
ing properties emerged if the local networks were encouraged
to establish attractor dynamics. It was that shown that, as the
network repeatedly receives and processes locally fedback infor-
mation, the identity of the fedback information changes. Starting
as a simple identification it evolves through a likeness, to an
appearance, and to an experience. So the repeated recognition
of its own representations could enable purely physical activi-
ties to have a phenomenological outcome. It is assumed that a
necessary condition for this to occur is for the network to have
top-down activation in order for the attractor behavior to be facil-
itated. There is some evidence that such behavior could occur,
and there are a number of predictions of the theory that could be
explored.
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